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GERMAN CONFLICT RULES AND THE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
Dagmar Coester-Waltjen*
I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenal growth of multinational enterprises raises-in
addition to economic, social, and political problems-the question
of the applicable law. The answer is to be drawn from private inter-
national law-or conflict of laws as it is called in the United States.
Especially during the last few years, approaches to problems of
conflict of laws have changed substantially; private international
law is in a state of flux and uncertainty. This applies to the United
States as well as to European countries.' The traditional idea of
formalistic jurisdiction-selecting rules, as proposed by Savigny, is
challenged by recent developments.' Europeans tend to show
greater interest in these approaches, most of which have been cre-
ated in the United States.' These changes are beginning to have an
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1 Peterson, The Law Applicable to Multinational Corporations from the Perspective of the
United States, in LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION 173, 174 (N. Hazard & W. Wagner eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Peterson];
Reese, Choice of Law in the United States: The Past, the Present and some Prophecies for
the Future, in LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLU-
TION 195 (N. Hazard & W. Wagner eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Reese]; Batiffol, L'Etat
du droit international priv6 en France et dans l'Europe continentale de l'ouest, 100 JOURNAL
DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL [J. DROIT INT'L] 22 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Battifol]; Zweigert,
Zur Armut des internationalen Privatrechts an sozialen Werten, 37 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFr FOR
AUSLXNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELS Z.] 435 (1973); Zweigert, Some
Reflections on the Sociological Dimensions of Private International Law or What is Justice
in Conflict of Laws?, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 283 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Zweigert].
I D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965); B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) [hereinafter cited as CuRRIE]; A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1962) [hereinafter cited as EHRENZWEIG]; Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in American
Perspective, in 131 ACADIkMIE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS 75 (1971) (1970
session of The Hague Academy of International Law); Ehrenzweig's Proper Law and Proper
Forum (a Symposium), 18 OKLA. L. REV. 233 (1965); Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study
in the Method of Case Law, 19 TUL. L. REv. 165 (1944); Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A
Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TuL. L. REV. 4 (1944); Zweigert, supra note 1.
' C. JOERGES, ZUM FUNKTIONSWANDEL DES KOLLISIONSRECHTS 16, 156 (1971); Kegel, The
Crisis of Conflict of Laws, in 112 ACAD9MIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURs 91
(1964) (1964 session of The Hague Academy of International Law); Gutzwiller, Von Ziel und
Methode des IPR, 25 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT [ScHw. JB. INT'L
RECHT] 161 (1968); Heini, Neuere Str6mungen im amerikanischen internationalen
Privatrecht, 19 ScHw. JB. INT'L REcHT 31 (1962); Neuhaus, Neue Wege im europdischen
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impact on the treatment of corporate problems.4
As far as German law is concerned, this impact is more evident
with regard to the question of what law governs the relation between
a parent company and a subsidiary. First, however, a threshold
problem of which conflict rule should be applied to determine the
nationality of a corporation will be dealt with.
II. CONFLICT RULES GOVERNING THE NATIONALITY OF A CORPORATION
A. Different Conflict Rules
1. Recognition and Personal Law
In determining which conflict rule controls the nationality of a
corporation the problem arises as to whether the same conflict rule
should be used for the purpose of recognizing a foreign national
company as for the purpose of searching the law applicable to the
internal affairs of the company (usually called the personal law).
a. Definition of Recognition. Recognition in this context means
the acknowledgement by one country of the corporate "capacity" of
an association given corporate capacity by another country.5 This
problem must be distinguished from the problems of doing business
in and having access to a national market; the latter are problems
of the law of aliens, while recognition is one of private international
internationalen Privatrecht, 35 RABELS Z. 401 (1971); Siehr, Ehrenzweigs lex Jori Theorie und
ihre Bedeutung fair das amerikanische und deutsche Kollionsrecht, 34 RABELS Z. 585 (1970).
1 For United States law on this point see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
302 (1969) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT 2D]; Peterson, supra note 1, at 177; Baade,
Multinationale Gesellschaften im amerikanischen Kollisionsrecht, 37 RASELS Z. 5, 21 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Baade]; Baraf, The Foreign Corporation-A Problem in Choice of Law
Doctrine, 33 Brooklyn L. Rev. 219 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Barafl; Hadari, The Choice
of National Law Applicable to the Multinational Enterprise and the Nationality of Such
Enterprises, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1 [hereinafter cited as Hadari]; Kaplan, Foreign Corporations
and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REV. 433 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan];
Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955-1956) [hereinafter cited as
Latty]. For a very reluctant view on this point see Reese, supra note 1, at 200. For the German
law point of view see W. BACHE, DER INTERNATIONALE UNTERNEHMENSVERTRAG NACH DEUTSCHEM
KOLLISIONSRECHT 35 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BACHE]; H.-G. KOPPENSTEINER, INTERNATION-
ALE UNTERNEHMEN IM DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT 92, 105 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
KOPPENSTEINER]; H. LUCHTERHAND, DEUTSCHES KONZERNRECHT BEI GRENZUBERSCHREITENDEN
KONZERNVERBINDUNCEN 53, 99 (1971) [hereinafter cited as LUCHTERHAND]; Immenga &
Klocke, Konzernkollisionsrecht, 92 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT [Z. SCHW.
REcHT] 27 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Immenga & Klocke]; Prihs, Gesellschaftsrechtliche
Probleme intemationaler Unternehmen, 18 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 395 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Pr(ihs].
' Note, The "Nationality" of International Corporations Under Civil Law and Treaty, 74
HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1439 (1961) [hereinafter cited as "Nationality" of International
Corporations].
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law.' The recognition of a foreign corporation in Germany and most
other European states is obtained today ipso jure; i.e., without the
need of any further step such as filing for registration, paying of fees,
or applying for a decree.' Nor is it necessary that the type of com-
pany be known under German law or be similar to corresponding
German institutions.' The business trust of American law, there-
fore, will be recognized in Germany, although there is no correspon-
ding institution known under German law? The only limitation on
this principle is public policy which might prevent recognition in
particular cases. This sounds very liberal, but one must keep in
mind that in German law a foreign corporation is recognized as a
legal entity only if it is incorporated under that law which, accord-
ing to the German conflict rule, is competent to govern the incorpo-
ration.
b. Determining the Conflict Rule. The question now is whether,
in determining the competent law, aspects must be taken into ac-
count other than those used in finding the personal law. The tradi-
tional view on this point is that different conflict rules may be
applied for the two purposes.'0 In order to justify this rule, the argu-
ment has been put forward that the question of recognition presents
a special problem which is totally unrelated to the personal law.
I G. BEITZKE, DIE JURISTISCHE PERSON IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT UND FREMDENRECHT
46 (1938) [hereinafter cited as BEITZKE]; KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 107; Grossfeld, Die
Anerkennung der Rechtsfdihigkeit juristischer Personen, 31 RABELS Z. 1, 3 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Grossfeld].
1 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 134 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as RABEL];
Beitzke, Anerkennung und Sitzverlegung von Gesellschaften und juristischen Personen im
EWG-Bereich, 127 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT
[Z.H.W.] 1, 3 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Beitzke, Anerkennung]; Fikentscher & Grossfeld,
The Proposed Directive on Company Law, 2 CoMM. MKT. L. REv. 259 (1964-1965)
[hereinafter cited as Fikentscher & Grossfeld]; Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 10.
I Schnitzer, Trust und Stiftung, 61 SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG [ScHw. J.Z.] 213
(1965).
' Serick, Zur Behandlung des anglo-amerikanischen Trust im Kontinentaleuropatischen
Recht, in 2 FESTSCHRIFT FOR HANS CARL NIPPERDEY 653 (R. Dietz & H. Hubner eds. 1965).
," LUCHTERHAND, supra note 4, at 5 n.10; Goldman, La reconnaissance mutuelle des sociktks
dans la Communautk kconomique europkenne, in ETUDES JURIDIQUES OFFERTES A LON JUILLOT
DE LA MORANDIERE 175, 195 (Facult6 de Droit et des Sciences Economiques, Paris 1964)
[hereinafter cited as Goldman]; Schnitzer, Die Treuhand (der Trust) und das IPR, in
GEDXCHTNISSCHRIr LUDWIG MARXER 53, 63 (A. Goop ed. 1963); Schwandt, Die Staatsangeh6-
rigkeit der Handelsgesellscha(ten, in DEUTSCHE LANDESREFERATE ZUM INTERNATIONALEN KON-
CRESS FOR R ECHTSVERGLEICHUNG Im HAAG (1932) (Sonderheft zu 6 RABELS Z. 196, 201 (1932))
[hereinafter cited as Schwandt]; Doralt, Anerkennung auslandischer Gesellschaften, 1969
OSTERREICHISCHE JURISTISCHE BLTTER 181 (1969); Fikentscher, Probleme des internationalen
Gesellschaftsrechts, 11 MONATSSCHRIFr FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT [M.D.R.] 71, 71 n.7 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Fikentscher]; Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 3; "Nationality" of Interna-
tional Corporations, supra note 5, at 1437.
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Other considerations should possibly be taken into account in deter-
mining the conflict rule." This argument loses weight if one consid-
ers the impact which acceptable regulations concerning the liability
of the corporation and the security of creditors and shareholders
(questions of personal law) have on the question of recognition.12 In
addition, a corporation recognized under one law but governed by
another law seems to be a "dead institution" under the recognizing
law.'3 Therefore, practically the same arguments are used in deter-
mining the conflict rule for recognition as are used in determining
the personal law,' and authors theoretically stressing the independ-
ence of these problems ultimately apply the same conflict rule for
both purposes. 5
Today the prevailing view in German law seems to be that only
one conflict rule governs these issues. 6 This attitude gives due re-
spect to the fact that two different conflict rules are neither desira-
ble nor logically necessary, since the question of whether one recog-
nizes an institution might be determined by the same law which
governs the existence of that institution. 7 The law governing the
existence of a corporation (personal law) controls the formation of
the company, its right to continue in existence, and the permissibil-
ity of its operations. The question of recognition is in fact only part
of this complex 8 and therefore should be governed by the same law.
Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 3.
2 KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 108-09. See also Judgment of June 3, 1964, 1965
AUSSENWIRTSCHAi-rSDIENST [AUSSEN W.] 175 (Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt) (capacity of trust
corporations of Liechtenstein).
'3 Drobnig, Kritische Bemerhungen zum Vorentwurf eines EWG-Obereinkommens fber
die Anerkennung von GeseUschaften, 129 Z.H.W. 93, 104, 120 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Drobnig].
" See Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 22.
's KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 109.
" BEITZKE, supra note 6, at 46; H. DLLE, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 112 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as DOLLE]; G. KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 233 (3d ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as KEGEL]; KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 108; L. RAAPE, INTERNATION-
ALES PRIVATRECHT 199 (5th ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as RAAPE]; 7 H. SOERGEL, BORGER-
LICHES GESETZBUCH (10th ed. W. Siebert 1971), Einfiihrungsgesetz zum Biirgerlichen Gesetz-
buch [EGBGB] by Kegel, art. 7 Vorbemerkung 152 [hereinafter cited as SOERGEL];Beitzke,
Anerkennung, supra note 7, at 3; Drobnig, Das EWG-Obereinkommens fiber die Anerken-
nung von GeseUschaften und juristischen Personen, 18 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 90, 93 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Drobnig, EWG]; Drobnig, supra note 13, at 110; Statement of Ernst
Wolff, International Law Association Forty-Sixth Conference, Aug. 12, 1954, in International
Company Law, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FoRTY-SIxTH CONFERENCE 364,
377-79 (1955); Judgment of Jan. 30, 1970, 53 BGHZ 181; Judgment of Oct. 17, 1968 (Bundes-
gerichtshof), 22 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [N.J.W.] 188 (1969); Judgment of July
11, 1957, 25 BGHZ 134, 144.
17 KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 108.
t' Drobnig, EWG, supra note 16, at 93.
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Due to the equality of the results, the different views never gained
much importance. However, the problem may gain more considera-
tion in connection with the European Convention on the Mutual
Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons'" which will be dis-
cussed later.
2. Conflict Rules for Internal and External Affairs
Having decided that the same conflict rule should govern the
recognition of a corporation and the determination of the personal
law, one must then face the second question of whether the applica-
ble personal law should include the relation between a corporation
and its creditors or whether different connecting factors should be
determinative for these affairs. The idea of different conflict rules
was put forward in 1970 by Grasmann, a German author.20 He
argues that there are different interests between wholly internal
regulations and those of creditors. Accordingly, different conflict
rules should govern under which each takes into consideration the
special facts and interests of that relation.2' Grasmann suggests, for
example, that a German stock corporation is liable to an American
creditor under section 114 of the Stock Corporation Act,22 if the
assessment of the assets, though correct under German law, does not
meet the requirements of New York law. The example itself shows
how complicated matters would become if this doctrine were to be
applied. Considering that there may be not only different, but also
contrary provisions in the laws governing the different "external"
affairs, it would become completely impossible for a company to act
in accordance with the law. 3 In addition, this would lead to differ-
ent treatment of foreign and domestic creditors. Grasmann justifies
this by citing advantages for international commerce 2 which are
supposed to be of some value to domestic creditors also. However,
this argument lacks plausibility because creditors in international
" Convention sur la reconaissance mutuelle des socidtds et personnes morales, done Feb.
29, 1968, [19731 BGBI. II 369, reprinted in 4 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DRorr EuaoPt4F 400
(1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Convention]. An unofficial English translation is available
in 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 6255 (1975).
" G. GRASMANN, SYSTEM DES INTERNATIONALEN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS (1970) [hereinafter
cited as GRASMANNI. The same idea was already carefully considered by Nial. Statement
of H. Nial, International Law Association Forty-Sixth Conference, Aug. 12, 1954, in
International Company Law, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FORTY-SIxTH
CONFERENCE 364, 372-74 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Nial].
" GRASMANN, supra note 20, at 343, 392; Priihs, supra note 4, at 397.
Law of Sept. 6, 1965, [19651 BGBI. 1 1089; see GRASMANN, supra note 20, at 80 n.28.
21 KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 111.
" GRASMANN, supra note 20, at 90, 479.
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commerce are accustomed to having foreign law govern their affairs,
especially when dealing with a foreign corporation,5 and because it
seems very doubtful whether domestic creditors gain advantages
from additional liabilities to foreigners.26
Besides these more practical considerations one must keep in
mind that the often very detailed rules embodied in a corporation
law constitute a uniform system.2 7 In this system questions of organ-
ization and of internal affairs correspond to provisions regulating
"external" affairs. Some of the former are only there because of the
latter and vice versa; they balance each other, and one should avoid
breaking up this system. 28 Therefore, Grasmann's approach, which
has been dealt with in a number of treatises, has not found many
friends.
Of course, applying only one conflict rule does not mean that all
corporate matters are controlled by the same law. For instance,
there are different conflict rules in questions of taxation, currency,
and antitrust law; there may even be some questions which concern
the "personal" affairs of a company and which, nevertheless, are
governed by a law other than personal law.29 Thus, two different sets
of law might be applied anyway. However, these cases are excep-
tions which are justified by very special circumstances, such as
when there is a statutory conflict rule for one special issue or when
the application of the foreign law would violate public policy.30
B. Determination of the Conflict Rule
Having reached the conclusion that the question of recognition as
well as the internal and external relations of a corporation are gov-
erned by the same law, the problem remains of how this law should
be determined.
1. Possible Connecting Factors
In looking for the appropriate conflict rules two theories prevail.
21 This view, with respect to shareholders of a foreign company, is expressly stated in 80-1I
BGE 53, 58 (Schweizerisches Bundesgericht). See also Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629
(1935); Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1925).
16 KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 112 n.60; M. LU'rrER, KAPITAL, SICHERUNG DER KAPITA-
LAUFBRINGUNG UND KAPITALERHALTUNG IN DEN AKTIEN-UND GMBH-RECHTEN DER EWG 16 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as LUrrER].
Nial, supra note 20, at 372 (criticizing his own suggestions).
2 KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 110, 112.
= See, e.g., 1896 RGBI. 604, BGBl. III 400-01.
Goldman, Le projet de convention entre les Etats membres de la Communaut Eco-
nomique Europkenne sur la reconnaissance mutuelle des socits et personnes morales, 31
RABELS Z. 201, 207 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Goldman, Le projet].
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The first theory refers to the country where the formalities of regis-
tration or publicity have been complied with and where the regis-
tered office is situated. This theory is called the incorporation doc-
trine and its prevails in the United States, Great Britain, Austria,
the Netherlands, and in some socialistic countries." On the other
side there is the theory of the "real seat." According to this doctrine
the company is governed by the law of the state in which it main-
tains its real seat. The real seat (si~ge social) is the country in which
the company has its head office (Verwaltungssitz). In order to avoid
confusion it should be mentioned that, in principle, this doctrine
requires incorporation according to the law of the seat.3" The real
seat theory prevails in most European countries.13
Aside from these two main approaches there are other theories
which have little acceptance. One of these is the law of the statutory
seat rule. This theory has no practical difference from the incorpora-
tion doctrine, since the state of incorporation usually requires that
the statutory seat of the company be within its borders.3 The theory
of the law of the place where most of the exploitation is done
(Betriebsstdtte, or lieu d'exploitation) is generally rejected, because
the "place" does not seem to have enough significance. Finally,
sometimes one will find mentioned a doctrine that the national law
of the majority of the natural persons who have the economic power
11 2 RABEL, supra note 7, at 38; Fikentscher, supra note 10, at 72; Grossfeld, supra note 6,
at 15. Especially for the United States see RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 4, § 296; Peterson,
supra note 1, at 177; Reese, supra note 1, at 203; Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing
Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
1118 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Reese & Kaufman]. For the United Kingdom see Dutch
West-India Co. v. Van Moses, 93 Eng. Rep. 723 (K.B. 1724); CHESHIRE'S PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 179 (7th ed. P. North 1965); A. DicEY & J. MoRRIs, CONFuCr OF LAWS 702 (9th
ed. 1973); M. WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW No. 281 (1945). For the Netherlands see
Law of July 25, 1959, 1959 STAATSBLAD 255; Czapski, Gesetzgebung der Niederlande auf dem
Gebiet des Privatrechts 1954-1959, 25 RASELS Z. 289, 303 (1960).
32 KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 105 n.37; 2 RABEL, supra note 7, at 38; Grossfeld, supra
note 6, at 32.
11 KEGEL, supra note 16, at 229; SOERGEL, supra note 16, art. 7 Vorbemerkung 142;
Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 12. For France see especially Loi n. 66-537 du 24 julliet 1966, sur
les socidtds commerciales, art. 3, [1966] J.O. 642, [1966] D.S.L. 265. For Switzerland see
76(1) BGE 150, 159. Contra, Niederer, Kollisionsrechtliche Probleme der juristischen Person,
in M. GUTZWILLER & W. NIEDERER, BEITRAGE zUM HAAGER INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT 107,
117 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Niederer].
1, KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 105; Niederer, supra note 33, at 114; Wolff,
Personalstatut far Gesellschaften, Vereine und Stiftungen, in FESTSCHRIr FOR MARTIN WOLFF
375, 384 (E. von Caemmerer, W. Hallstein, F. Mann, & L. Raiser eds. 1952); Fikentscher,
supra note 10, at 72; Vischer, Bemerkungen zur Aktiengesellschaft im internationalen
Privatrecht, 17 SCHW. JB. IrNr'L REcHT 49, 53 (1960).
1 KEGEL, supra note 16, at 232; RAAPE, supra note 16, at 196; Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 7,
11.
1976]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
over the corporation, or who are its founders, should govern.38 How-
ever, this doctrine never really plays any important role in deter-
mining the personal law,37 though it might be important in some
other respects, for instance in public international law. 8
As only the law of the real seat and the law of incorporation
doctrines are of significance today, it seems worthwhile to examine
them closely, comparing their particular advantages and disadvant-
ages, especially since recent legal articles indicate a trend in Europe
to favor the incorporation doctrine and a trend in the United States
to favor the rule of the real seat. 0
2. The Incorporation Doctrine-Arguments Pro and Con
a. Logical Reasons. The doctrine of incorporation has its origin
in the theory that a legal person is a fiction.40 From this the conclu-
sion has been drawn that logically the law which has created the
legal personality must govern the question of recognition, etc., This
argument is only true, however, insofar as the applicable law is
concerned, when the legal person is recognized. It has no logical
bearing on the question of whether courts should recognize a legal
person as properly incorporated. In addition, this argument cannot
be asserted against the law of the seat doctrine, since that theory
also requires incorporation according to the law of the seat.
b. Certainty. The most favorable argument for the incorporation
rule is that it provides certainty and maximum uniformity in the
choice of law.43 It is easy and clear to ascertain the state of incorpo-
U SOERGEL, supra note 16, art. 7 Vorbemerkung 147; Fikentescher, supra note 10, at 72.
31 Fikentscher, supra note 10, at 72.
31 For the purpose of determining the nationality of an expropriated corporation see
Bockstiegel, Enteignungs- oder Nationalisierugsmassnahmen gegen ausliindische
Kapitalgesellschaften, volkerrechtliche Aspekte, in BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHFN GESELLSCHAnr
FOR VOLKERRECHT, HEFT 13, 35 (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur V6lkerrecht 1974). For the purpose
of determining diplomatic protection rights see Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co.
Case, [1973] I.C.J. 2, where the International Court of Justice rejected an attempt to "pierce
the corporate veil." See also Metzger, Nationality of Corporate Guarantee Schemes, 65 AM.
J. INT'L L. 532 (1971).
3' For mention of that change in Europe see Conard, Company Laws of the European
Communities from an American Viewpoint, in THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY
LAw 45, 56 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Conard]; Grossfeld, supra note 6,
at 14. For European authors applying the incorporation doctrine see note 146 infra. For
American authors see Peterson, supra note 1, at 177; Baade, supra note 4, at 21; Hadari, supra
note 4, at 34.
40 GRASMANN, supra note 20, at 320; 2 RABEL, supra note 7, at 31.
, Fikentscher, supra note 10, at 72.
4' KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 121; Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 31.
'3 BEITZKE, supra note 6, at 21; GRASMANN, supra note 20, at 273; KOPPENSTEINER, supra note
4, at 121; Niederer, supra note 33, at 124; Hadari, supra note 4, at 13; Stein, Conflict-of-Laws
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ration. Each forum concerned with the applicable law will arrive at
the same result.44
c. Practicability. Furthermore, it has been stressed that this
rule enables the corporation to move its seat freely without legal
consequences, thus guaranteeing great practicability which is a ne-
cessity in international commerce.45
d. Liberal Recognition Practice. The liberal recognition practice
which is facilitated by this rule is another point which the represent-
atives of this theory emphasize, because this is said to be a desirable
contribution to international economic relations. 46
e. Party Autonomy. The next argument is closely connected
with the practicability and liberal recognition practice arguments.
It is said that only the incorporation doctrine gives due respect to
the principle of party autonomy, by enabling the founders to choose
the state of incorporation."
f. Multilateral Conflict Rule. Finally, it has been stressed that
this conflict rule is not only a clear one but is also desirable because
it is a multilateral rule (allseitige Kollisionsnorm).5 A multilateral
rule is always more desirable than a unilateral rule, since it will lead
to uniformity of results and will prevent the case in which two or
more national laws are claimed to be applicable.
g. Economic Risks. On the other hand, the opponents of this
theory emphasize that these advantages are achieved by a far too
costly price."9 They especially point out that the incorporation doc-
trine opens the doors for abuse and fraud. 0 The founders of the
corporation are enabled to choose the law which is most favorable
and liberal to them and which imposes less liability. If they so
desire, they can avoid the application of the provisions enacted by
Rules by Treaty: Recognition of Companies in a Regional Market, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1327, 1332
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Stein].
See Lazard Bros. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., [1933] A.C. 289, 297 (K.B.).
's GRASMANN, supra note 20, at 235; KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 122; Beitzke,
Anerkennung, supra note 7, at 24; Drobnig, supra note 13, at 115.
1s KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 123; Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 23; Kdtz, Anmerkung
zum OLG Frankfurt vom 3.6.1964, 56 GMBH RUNDSCHAU 69, 70 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
K~tz].
1 Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 23; Hadari, supra note 4, at 19; Stein, supra note 43, at 1333.
For discussion of party autonomy see The Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972);
DOLuL, supra note 16, at 113, 124; KEGEL, supra note 16, at 255; R. UMBRICHT, DIE IMMANENTEN
SCHRANKEN DER RECHTSWAHL IM INTERNATIONALEN SCHULDVERTRAGSRECHT 43 (1963); Gam-
illscheg, Rechtswahl, Schwerpunkt und mutmasslicher Parteiwille im internationalen
Vertragsrecht, 157 ARCHvl FOR CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [A.C.P.] 303, 313 (1958-1959).
KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 135.
' Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 46.
10 KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 123, 131; Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 24, 27, 29.
19761
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
the state of the real seat to protect its creditors or shareholders.5
The incorporation of a company is deemed to be something different
from a contract; the principle of party autonomy cannot be applied
to it in the same way, because a corporation is an institution which
bases lasting influence on the social situation and circumstances of
a country and which affects more people than those directly con-
cerned. 52 Furthermore, it has been argued that where there is an
objective connecting point (objektiver Anknupftingspunkt),5 3 the
subjective element and the will of the parties must give way to the
state whose law is interested in governing the affair," and the law
of a state which has no real connecting factor55 cannot prevail.
3. The Real Seat Doctrine-Arguments Pro and Con
a. Favorable Arguments. As may be imagined, most of the argu-
ments used against the incorporation doctrine are asserted in favor
of the real seat theory; namely, that this rule prevents fraud on, or
abuse of, the law.5" The strongest argument is the intimate connec-
tion of the corporation with the economic, political, social, and cul-
tural life of the state of the real seat.57 The offices are located in the
state, the shareholders meet there, most of the managers, sharehold-
ers, and creditors live there, and all the workers live there." Thus,
only the real seat doctrine is said to reflect economic reality. Fur-
thermore, it meets the general principle of private international law
that the law of that state which is mostly concerned with the matter
should control.
b. Unfavorable Arguments. Since the objections against the real
seat rule usually are identical with the advantages praised in favor
of the incorporation rule, they should be mentioned here only very
briefly. It is said that the task of determining the location of the
61 KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 123; SOERGEL, supra note 16, art. 7 Vorbemerkung; 6 J.
STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH 128, by Raape (9th ed. 1931)
[hereinafter cited as STAUDINGER]; Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 24; Stein, supra note 43, at
1333.
11 2 P. ARMINJON, PRPcIs DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIv9 455 (1958); Grossfeld, supra note 6,
at 30; Kessler, Das far die Aktiengesellschaft massgebende Recht, 3 RABELS Z. 758,767 (1929).
3 See 1 RABEL, supra note 7, at 48.
11 6 STAUDINGER, supra note 51, at 128.
5 KEGEL, supra note 16, at 232.
H. BATIFFOL, TRAIT9 IL9MENTAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIvi No. 194 (3d ed. 1959);
EHRENZWEIG, supra note 2, at 411; E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS 32
(1971) [hereinafter cited as STEIN, HARMONIZATION]; Hadari, supra note 4, at 10.
", KEGEL supra note 16, at 232; 2 RABEL, supra note 7, at 131; 6 STAUDINGER, supra note 51,
at 128; Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 24.
11 KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 133 (for the last point especially); 2 RABEL, supra note
7, at 41; SOERGEL, supra note 16, art. 7 Vorbemerkung 151; Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 22, 33.
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company's real seat is often difficult59 and even impossible if the
corporation has two headquarters." This produces, at the very least,
uncertainty about the applicable law. In addition, this theory hin-
ders the transmission of the seat from one state to another and
therefore does not meet the requirements of international trade.
Finally, it is emphasized that today the real seat is not always the
center of the economic relations, since a large number of the share-
holders and even of the directors live outside the state of the head-
quarters.'
4. Statutory Guidelines
German statutory rules (not including rules established by
treaty)"2 determining the personal law of a corporation are lacking.
There is no provision concerning legal entities in the Introductory
Law to the German Civil Code 3 (EGBGB). Sometimes section 5 of
the 1965 German Stock Corporation Act 4 is interpreted as laying
down the real seat doctrine. This provision has only internal signifi-
cance, however, and is irrelevant as far as conflict of laws is con-
cerned.
5. Attitude of German Courts
a. Early Courts and the Reichsgericht. The first known decision
of a German court concerning conflict rules as applied to a legal
entity dates back to 18495 and applies the seat rule. In general, one
can say that the pre-1945 German Supreme Court (Reichsgericht)
So KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 124; Reese & Kaufman, supra note 31, at 1127; Stein,
supra note 43, at 1333.
S GRASMANN, supra note 20, at 227; KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 121. See also Hadari,
supra note 4, at 10; Van Hecke, Nationality of Companies Analysed, 8 NEDERLANDS TiJDscH-
RIFT VOOR INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 223 (1961).
' KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 124.
62 The question of the effect of section 12a of Gewerbeordnung will be dealt with, therefore,
in connection with the EEC Treaty and Conventions.
"3 Articles 7 to 31 of the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code contain rules on con-
flict of laws. Article 10, which made a foreign fraternity not automatically recognized, has
been abolished.
" Law of Sept. 6, 1965, [1965] BGBI., 1 1089; see R. GODIN & H. WILHELMI, KOMMENTAR
ZUM AKTIENGESETZ 3RD ED., SEC. 5 ANMERKUNG 5 (1967); 2 RABEL, supra note 7, at 34. Section
5 of the former Aktiengesetz (1937) was nearly identical with 1965 Aktiengesetz § 5. 1965
Aktiengesetz § 5 reads:
The domicile of the company shall be the place specified in the articles of incor-
poration. As a rule, the articles of incorporation shall designate as the domicile the
place where the company is engaged in business, or the place from which the
company is managed or administered.
L. VON BAR, DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVAT- UND STRAFRECHT 135 n.1 (1862) (mentioning the
August 8, 1849 decision of the Prussian Obertribunal in Berlin).
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also followed the seat doctrine8 and usually applied the law of the
state of the head office. The best known decision is the "Mexican
Case" in which a corporation, incorporated in Washington, D.C.,
doing business in Mexico, but having its head office in Hamburg,
was held to be subject to German law and accordingly not to be a
validly incorporated company.67 But there are other deci-
sions-though only a few-in which the incorporation doctrine is
favored. 8 The reason for this might be that in these cases the con-
flicting states were parts or former parts of the German territory (or
became such parts) and that nonrecognition would have caused
undesirable economic results.
But besides these side steps, two modified attitudes of the older
decisions might be mentioned. The first such attitude appears in a
case in which a company was incorporated in Germany but later
moved its head office to Hungary. 9 The corporation was held to be
a German corporation and subject to German law. Some authors
regard this decision as one not simply following the incorporation
doctrine, but establishing the principle that German law governs (1)
when the real seat is in Germany and (2) when the company is
incorporated under German law, wherever the real seat might be.70
This would mean that the German conflict rule is at least partly
unilateral. Though such unilateral rules are neither inadmissible
nor unusual, the extension of the applicability of the internal law,
thereby repelling the application of foreign law, is not desirable from
a conflict of laws viewpoint,' since according to the principle of
private international justice,"2 a state should apply foreign law as
well as the domestic law.73 However, it does not seem useful to delve
deeper into this matter, as it is quite doubtful that the Reichsgericht
did in fact develop such a rule. It might just as easily be true that
IS 159 RGZ 34; 83 RGZ 367; 77 RGZ 366; 7 RGZ 68; 1934 DEUTSCHE RECHTSPRECHUNG AUF
DEM GEBIETE DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS [D.R.G.I.P.] nos. 10, 11 (Reichsgericht);
1904 JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [JuR. WoCH.] 231 (Reichsgericht).
"7 1904 JUR. WOCH. 231 (Reichsgericht). For a criticism of this decision see H. KRONSTEIN,
THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AMERICAN PARENT CORPORATIONS AND THEIR FOREIGN
SUBSIDIARIES 52 (1940) [hereinafter cited as KRONSTEIN]. See note 146 infra and
accompanying text for Kronstein's critical point.
11 100 RGZ 210; 99 RGZ 218; 6 RGZ 138; 1920 JUR. WocH. 50 (Reichsgericht); 1918 JuR.
WOCH. 305 (Reichsgericht); see H. LEWALD, DAS DEUTSCHE INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT AUF
GRUNDLAGE DER RECHTSPRECHUNG 1949 (1931).
, 1934 JUR. WOCH. 2969 (Reichsgericht).
70 BEITZKE, supra note 6, at 88, 106; KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 127, 129, 135.
7' KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 135; 1 RABEL, supra note 7, at 61. The opposite attitude
is said to be justified by the principle of sovereignty. KEGEL, supra note 16, at 105-06.
72 KEGEL, supra note 16, at 42.
13 Id. at 42-56, 106.
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this decision is one where the court applied the incorporation rule
and did not look especially at the fact that Germany was the state
of incorporation."'
The second modification of the real seat rule relates to the ques-
tion of renvoi. The only decision concerning this problem seems to
be one from 1927 involving the "Eskimo Pie Corporation," which
incorporated in Delaware but had its head office in Kentucky. The
Reichsgericht held that this company was a validly incorporated
entity despite the fact that the real seat was not in the state of
incorporation.75 The court did not mention the principle of renvoi
expressly and seemed not to be very clear on that point. However,
the decision was interpreted in legal articles as containing the prin-
ciple that where the state of the real seat and the state of the incor-
poration follow the incorporation doctrine, a company validly incor-
porated according to the incorporation doctrine will be recognized
in Germany." This basis for the conclusion may be somewhat thin,
but the interpretation presently seems to be undisputed.
b. Jurisdiction after World War I. The post-1945 German Su-
preme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) dealt with many problems con-
cerning expropriated companies, especially "Spaltgesellschaften,"
but from these decisions little can be said about the conflict of the
incorporation and the real seat doctrines.7 Besides these decisions
there are a number of others which emphasize that the personal law
is determined by the law of the real seat.7" However, it should be
mentioned that in these decisions the state of the real seat was also
the state of incorporation and that there was not really a conflict to
decide. Cases in which the real seat was in a different state than in
that of incorporation mostly involved trust companies incorporated
in Liechtenstein and having the real seat in Germany. Some of these
decisions resolve the problem by applying the ordre public restric-
tion, denying recognition because the limitations of liability violate
public policy.79 Logically, this method implies the application of the
As interpreted by LUCHTERHAND, supra note 4, at 13.
" Case of Eskimo Pie Corp., 117 RGZ 215 (1927). For discussions of renvoi see KEGEL, supra
note 16, at 140; 1 RABEL, supra note 7, at 75-90; von Mehren, The Renvoi and its Relation to
Various Approaches to the Choice of Law Problem, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND
CONFLICTS LAW: LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 380-95 (K. Nadelman, A. von
Mehren, & J. Hazard eds. 1961).
?a KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 106, 136; RAAPE, supra note 16, at 199; 2 RABEL, supra
note 7, at 50; Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 12, 13; Stein, supra note 43, at 1330.
77 LUCHTERHAND, supra note 4, at 17, 18.
IN Judgment of May 5, 1960, 32 BGHZ 256, 258; 1956-1957 D.R.G.I.P. 77
(Bundesgerichtshof); 1958-1959 D.R.G.I.P. 88 (Oberlandesgericht D*sseldorf).
1, 1965 AUSSEN W. 175 (Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart); 1965 AUSSEN W. 177 (Oberlandes-
gericht Hamburg).
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incorporation rule, because otherwise ordre public would not have
become relevant. But the two courts did not mention this principle
and possibly neither wanted to apply it. There are other decisions
in which the rule of the real seat is applied"0 and accordingly the
company is held to be invalid under German law.
6. Experiences with the American Approach
a. Development. In the United States the application of the
incorporation doctrine originally led from strict company laws in the
different states to a "race of laxity" in state legislation."' Smaller
and sparsely industrialized states, especially, enacted laws very fa-
vorable to the founders. The risk they took by this was small, be-
cause it was unlikely that there would be much business or many
creditors or shareholders within their state. Thus, they gained taxes
and fees without the fear of a possible disadvantageous impact on
their entire economic system. Of course, this development could not
remain without some reaction. The reaction came from four differ-
ent directions: the courts, the federal legislature, the state legisla-
ture, and authorities within the legal profession.
b. Reaction of the Federal Legislature. The federal legislature
has intervened only in a few respects; namely, by enacting the Se-
curities Act of 193382 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 81 It
is impossible to discuss these matters more deeply here, but it might
be mentioned that this type of legislation is sometimes called the
"federal law of corporations." 4
c. Reaction of State Legislatures. A similar but even stronger
development is to be noticed in state legislatures. California and
so 70 DER BETRIEB 441 (Bundesgerichtshof); 1965 AussEN W. 175 (Oberlandesgericht Frank-
furt); Judgment of July 11, 1967 (Landgericht Aurich), cited in GRASMANN supra note 20, at
177 n.23a.
" "The race was one not of diligence but of laxity." Ligget Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559
(1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
:2 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
82 Id. § 78a et seq. Sections 1331, 1332, and 1445(c) of the Federal Jurisdictional Statute,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-61 (1970), touch a different matter as their purpose is to reduce the cases
in the federal courts by denying diversity of citizenship jurisdiction if the grounds for assert-
ing such jurisdiction are only that the corporation is incorporated in a different state than
that of the adverse party. See Note, New Federal Jurisdictional Statute Achieves Early
Success in Reducing Number of District Court Case Filings but Presents Interpretive
Difficulties, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1287 (1958). The effect of these statutes is also important for
foreign (i.e., non-United States) corporations because the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
might have extraterritorial application if it is necessary to protect American investors. See
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Kohn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
84 Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law:" An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965).
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New York, especially, have adopted several statutes concerning the
internal relations of a corporation which also apply to foreign corpo-
rations (corporations incorporated outside of the United States)
doing business in the state.85
d. Reaction of the Courts. The strongest reaction against the
abuse of the incorporation rule has come, however, from the courts.
Although it must be noted that some courts still follow the incorpo-
ration rule in all cases,8" other courts began quite early to distinguish
between truly foreign corporations and those which were "pseudo-
foreign,""7 or "migratory or tramp"88 corporations. The courts pay
much attention to the fact that a company is only "nominally a
corporation of the other state,"8 that "its residence outside the
forum state is a merest fiction,"90 or that "its existence in the state
of incorporation is an illusory mirage, more atmospheric, than
real."' But besides these cases where the question in issue can be
resolved quite easily by the principle of fraus legis-though it might
sometimes be difficult to draw the line-there are other cases in-
volving no obvious abuse of law. In these cases the courts have
nevertheless applied domestic provisions for the protection of the
shareholders of foreign corporations.2 This is usually done if the
provision in question is protective of persons having a close connec-
tion with the forum93 or if application of the provision is required to
protect other domestic interests. 4 Here, the modern choice of law
83 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25008, 25103(b) (West pamphlet 1975). A similar result
was achieved by the courts in Western Airlines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12
Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961); see N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1316-20 (McKinney 1963). See also BAADE,
supra note 4, at 26; Peterson, supra note 1, at 183; Dodd, Statutory Developments in Business
Corporation Law, 50 HARV. L. REv. 27 (1936) [hereinafter cited as Dodd]; Hadari, supra note
4, at 48; Reese & Kaufman, supra note 31, at 1129.
AG See e.g., Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1962); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Levien v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 261 A.2d 911 (Del. 1969).
' Goodwin v. Claytor, 137 N.C. 224, 49 S.E. 173 (1904).
Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 193 Okla. 120, 141 P.2d 571 (1943).
" Goodwin v. Claytor, 137 N.C. 224, 49 S.E. 173 (1904).
" Wait v. Kern River Mining, Milling, and Dev. Co., 157 Cal. 16, 21,106 P. 98, 100 (1909).
" State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co., 231 Iowa 784, 807, 2 N.W.2d 372, 386,
modified, 232 Iowa 139, 4 N.W.2d 869 (1942). See also Western Airlines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191
Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961) (in which the corporation was originally a Califor-
nia corporation but reincorporated in Delaware); State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa
1298, 31 N.W.2d 853 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949); Latty, supra note 4, at 150;
Reese & Kaufman, supra note 31, at 1018-19.
" Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 885 (1959); Peterson, supra note 1, at 189.
'3 Latty, supra note 4, at 137; Peterson, supra note 1, at 183.
" Baade, supra note 4, at 27-28.
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theories-particularly Currie's interest analysis-have great impact
on the courts.
e. Opinion in Legal Writings. This leads to the fourth element,
the legal literature. From the modern choice of law approaches,
Brainerd Currie's interest analysis is probably the one which has
had the most significant impact on the conflict rules here in ques-
tion. Currie analyzes the interest of the concerned states according
to the purpose of the substantial law in question 5 and thus obtains
a possibly wide range for the application of domestic law. Much
more reluctant in this respect is the Second Restatement which
allows deviation from the incorporation rule only in unusual cases
where there is a special interest of the state in regulating the con-
crete problem." The Restatement, although not as far-reaching as
the 1969 Proposed Official Draft,97 requires a "most significant rela-
tionship," thus softening the "hard and fast" rule. 8 Besides these
flexible case-by-case approaches, other authors concerned about the
uncertainty which has resulted from the restriction of the incorpora-
tion rule think that the real seat rule would resolve these problems
in the best way. 9
7. International Treaties
a. International Law Association Draft Convention. The Draft
Convention on Conflicts of Laws Relating to Companies, 0° issued by
the International Law Association in 1960, provides in article 2 for
the application of the law of the state of incorporation, but contains
a restriction insofar as an "effective connection" with, or "effective
link" to, that state is necessary.10°
b. Draft Resolution of the Institut de Droit International. Simi-
larly, the Draft Resolution'"2 of the Institut de droit international,
concerning conflict rules for stock corporations, favors the incorpo-
ration doctrine in article 1, though limitations on this doctrine are
'9 CURRIE, supra note 2.
" RESTATEMENT 2D, supra note 4, §§ 302, 304, 306; Reese, supra note 1, at 203.
See RESATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (Proposed Official Draft 1969),
which included an example for the case in which a most significant relationship was missing.
This example was struck out at the 1969 meeting of the American Law Institute. However,
the Institute did not return to the "pure" incorporation rule. See Baade, supra note 4, at 21.
" Reese, supra note 1, at 201; Peterson, supra note 1, at 191 (view similar to that of Reese).
EHRENZWEIG, supra note 2, at 411; Peterson, supra note 1, at 179; Baraf, supra note 4, at
224; Dodd, supra note 85, at 59; Kaplan, supra note 4, at 433; Latty, supra note 4, at 169.
"' INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FORTY-NINTH CONFERENCE 93 (1961)
(1960 Hamburg Conference).
"' Id. art. 2.
51 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 319 (1965).
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found in articles 3 and 4.
c. 1951 Hague Convention. The Hague Convention Concerning
the Recognition of Foreign Companies, Associations, and Founda-
tions,' 3 which has been signed only by three states and is unlikely
to come into effect, also applies, in principle, the incorporation rule,
but leaves the issue to the concerned state in such a way that a state
following the real seat rule may apply that rule as long as the corpo-
ration has its seat in the state's jurisdiction. 04
d. Treaty of Rome. The Treaty of Rome' °5 is of more practical
significance. Article 58, paragraph 1 of the Treaty reads:
Companies and firms [sociths] formed in accordance with the
law of a member state and having their registered office, central
administration or principal place of business within the com-
munity shall, for the purpose of applying the provisions of this
chapter, be treated in the same way as individual Members.' 6
The chapter in question (chapter 2 of title 3 of part 2) regulates the
right of establishment within the Common Market. Granting the
right of establishment implies the recognition of the legal entity' 7
and thus involves a conflict of laws problem. Since-according to
the wording of article 58, paragraph 1-a registered office in one
Member State is sufficient, this provision expresses the incorpora-
tion doctrine. 08 It has been argued that the provision contains an
editorial mistake and that it should be read "registered office and
central administration or principal place of business," 0 1 because the
recognition of a company with neither the central administration
nor the principal place of business in one of the Member State's
territory would not be in the interest of any member. This view has
been rejected, however, due to the clear wording of the article."
" Done Oct. 31, 1951, reprinted in 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 277 (1951).
"o Id. art. 2; see KEGEL, supra note 16, at 237; RAAPE, supra note 16, at 210.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (unofficial English version) [hereinafter cited as Rome Treaty].
I" Emphasis added; translation by the author. For an interpretation of the terms "compa-
nies" and "firms" (soci~t~s) see STEIN, HARMONIZATION, supra note 56, at 28.
10 U. EVERLING, DAS NIEDERLASSUNGSRECHT IM GEMEINSAMEN MARKT 35 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as EVERUNG]; Goldman, supra note 10, at 184; Beitzke, Anerkennung, supra note 7, at
2; Drobnig, EWG, supra note 16, at 90, 92; Fikentscher & Grossfeld, supra note 7, at 259;
Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 17.
" Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 17; Stein, supra note 43, at 1336.
'" Audinet, Le droit d'ktablissement dans la Communaut 6conomique europ~enne, 86 J.
DROIT INT'L 982, 1016 (1959).
"' STEIN, HARMONIZATION, supra note 56, at 29; Goldman, Bericht fiber den Entwurf eines
Obereinkommens fiber die gegenseitige Anerkennung von Gesellschaften und juristischen
Personem, in DRUCKSACHE DER KOMMISSION DER EWG 8106/IV/65 - D 15; Goldman, Le projet,
supra note 30, at 29; Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 18.
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Nevertheless, the impact of this provision is not as great as one is
inclined to think prima facie, because this provision has significance
only in connection with article 52 of the Rome Treaty, which pro-
vides for freedom of establishment and which requires in addition
that the corporation in question be "established" in the Common
Market as a prerequisite for the exercise of the freedom to set up
"agencies, branches or subsidiaries." '' Accordingly the General
Program provides that a company which wants to profit from the
freedom of establishment under article 58, paragraph 1 of the Rome
Treaty must show that its business activity constitutes "a continu-
ous and effective link with the economy of the Member States.""12
Furthermore, it has been stressed that the liberal posture of article
58 is obviously related to the harmonization of the national com-
pany laws required by the treaty."3 As long as the harmonization is
only in process, article 58 merely remains as a prospectus."4
As far as Germany is concerned, however, this provision has al-
ready had an influence on German law, since the text of article 58,
paragraph 1, together with the said wording of the General Program,
has been enacted in section 12a of the German Business Regula-
tions."5 But from this it does not thereby follow that the incorpora-
tion doctrine is adopted. Section 12a provides that a foreign corpo-
ration similar to one mentioned by article 58, paragraph 1, is not
compelled to obtain permission for establishing a trade otherwise
required by section 12 of the regulations. Though-as it was said
before-the granting of the right of establishment implies the recog-
nition, it was not intended to create a conflict rule for recognition.
This is shown by Gewerbeordnung section 12a, which deals with the
problem of a foreign corporation which has established a trade, but
is not recognized as a legal entity in Germany."'
e. 1968 EEC Convention. Article 220 of the Rome Treaty re-
"I Rome Treaty, supra note 105, art. 52; see EVERUNG, supra note 107, at 39; STEIN,
HARMONIZATION, supra note 56, at 31; Beitzke, Anerkennung, supra note 7, at 12; Grossfeld,
supra note 6, at 18.
"1 5 AMTSBLATT" DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFrEN 36 (1962). The General Programs "de-
fine categories of national discriminatory restrictions on access to the many enumerated
occupations and professions, and fix deadlines within which, these restrictions must be re-
moved." Stein, supra note 43, at 1336 n.40.
"' Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 19; Stein, supra note 43, at 1336.
" Beitzke, Anerkennug, supra note 7, at 2; Drobnig, supra note 13, at 102; Grossfeld, supra
note 6, at 19.
"' GEWERBEORDNUNc as of Aug. 13, 1965, BGB1. I 849.
"' The contrary view of Koppensteiner does not seem to be sound, as the limitation of
section 12a to cases where the nonrecognition is due to ordre public problems has no founda-
tion. KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 117.
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quests the Member States to enter into negotiations with each other
to ensure "for the benefit of their nationals. . . the mutual recogni-
tion of companies within the meaning of Article 58, second para-
graph, the maintenance of their legal personality in cases where the
registered office is transferred from one country to another .
On this background the Member States contracted the Convention
on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons."7 An
enormous number of legal articles have been written on the Conven-
tion."' As it is not even possible to list all authors here, it is even
less possible to take into account everything which has been said
about the Convention. Thus, only a short overview of the main
controversies can be given.
The Convention contains conflict rules on the recognition of cor-
porations. The scope of the Convention is limited to commercial and
private companies which are capable of having rights and obliga-
tions under the law of incorporation, but which need not be regarded
as full-fledged legal entities under that law."9 Furthermore, the
Convention is restricted to corporations, organized under the law of
a Member State, which have their registered seats in the territories
to which the Convention applies.' If these prerequisites are ful-
filled, the corporation is recognized by every Member State with the
effect that it shall have the same capacity accorded to it by the law
under which it was formed.'2 ' This is clearly the adoption of the
incorporation doctrine. 22 However, it must be mentioned that be-
sides other restrictions on the application of the law of incorpora-
tion,123 the Convention makes important concessions to advocates of
the real seat doctrine in articles 3 and 4. Thus, each state may
declare that it will deny recognition to any company whose real seat
1968 Convention, supra note 19.
"' See, e.g., Stein, supra note 43, at 1337 (including references to these articles). See also
Conard, supra note 39, at 57; Beitzke, ZurAnerkennung von Handelsgesellschaften im EWG-
Bereich, 14 AUSSEN W. 91 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung]; Beitzke,
Anerkennung, supra note 7; Drobnig, EWG, supra note 16, at 91 & n.14; Goldman, Le projet,
supra note 30, at 201.
"1 1968 Convention, supra note 19, arts. 1, 8 (thus the German Oflene Handelsgesellschaft
is included); see STEIN, HARMONIZATION supra note 56, at 406; Drobnig, Das EWG, supra note
16, at 92. The Convention also includes legal persons of public and private law other than
companies engaged in economic activities. 1968 Convention, supra note 19, art. 2.
" 1968 Convention, supra note 19, art. 1.
.. Id. arts. 1, 6.
' STEIN, HARMONIZATION, supra note 56, at 409; Drobnig, EWG, supra note 16, at 92.
" The recognizing state may deny rights which it does not accord to companies of a
corresponding type which are subject to its own law. 1968 Convention, supra note 19, art. 7.
A state may not apply the Convention if its ordre public international would be violated. Id.
art. 9.
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is outside the said territories and which does not have a genuine link
with the economy of one of these territories.'24 Besides the problem
of what is required to come within the meaning of the term "genuine
link," '125 this provision does not really produce any significant ad-
vantages for the contracting parties. 2 ' The underlying theory seems
to be that, otherwise, a noncommunity enterprise, on the basis of a
"post office box" address, 2 ' could establish branches within the
Common Market and would have to be recognized. This, however,
is merely a question of the right of access and not one of recogni-
tion. 8 Therefore, it would seem a better idea to deal with this
question only where the right of establishment is in issue. Neverthe-
less, the provision will not have a great impact, since other more
favorable principles on recognition are not affected.'29 Thus, the
renvoi principle of the Eskimo Pie Corp. Case'3 may still remain
good law,'' although Germany has made the reservation under arti-
cle 3.112
The second, more important, concession to the real seat doctrine
is the troublesome provision of article 4 of the Convention, which
provides that a state is left free to declare its own mandatory law
applicable to a corporation formed elsewhere but having its real seat
within the territory of that state. Even the nonmandatory provisions
may be applied unless the charter of the corporation provides other-
wise or unless the company can prove that it has actually exercised
its activity for a reasonable time in the state of incorporation. At
first glance this provision seems to meet the reasonable interests of
the state of the real seat, but upon closer examination, it appears
to give rise to a number of problems. First, there will be the uncer-
24 Id. art. 3.
125 See B. GOLDMAN. PatcIS DE DROIT COMMERCIAL EUROPtEN 567, 572 (1970); F. CARUSO, LE
SOCIETA NELLA COMMUNITA ECONOMICA EUROPA 217 (1969); STEIN, HARMONIZATION, supra note
56, at 409; Cerexhe, La reconnaissance mutuelle des socitks et personnes morales dans la
Communautk kconomique europenne, 1968 REVUE DE MARCH9 COMMUN 578, 586 (1968).
"I, Drobnig, EWG, supra note 16, at 96 & nn. 54-56; Drobnig, Conflict of Laws and the
European Economic Community, 15 Am. J. CoMP. L. 204, 208 (1966-1967).
127 STEIN, HARMONIZATION, supra note 56, at 409.
" While the granting of a right to access implies the recognition of the company, recogni-
tion on its own does not grant automatically a right to access. Drobnig, EWG, supra note 16,
at 92.
12g 1968 Convention, supra note 19, art. 11, para. 2.
117 RGZ 215 (1927). See notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text.
"' Drobnig, EWG, supra note 16, at 96.
.2 [1972] BGB1. II 369, art. 2, para. 1. See also DENKSCHRIFT DER BUNDESREGIERUNG BT
DRUCKSACHE VI/1976, at 21-35. The reservation is also made by France (EXPOSE DES MOTIFS,
JOURNAL OFFICIEL, DOCUMENTS DE L'ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, ANNEXES 1232-33 (1969)) and Italy
(Note, 1971 RIVISTA DI DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 956).
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tainty about what are mandatory and nonmandatory provisions. A
uniform interpretation could not be agreed upon,'33 and this ques-
tion will have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. However, this
problem will only be a minor one, at least in Germany, because it
is common to divide the law into these two complexes. 3 ' The more
serious effect of this provision is that it leads to different recognition
in different states. A company incorporated under Dutch law having
its real seat in Germany will be subject to Dutch law in all other
member states (even if they have made the reservation under article
3) except in Germany, which will apply (at least) its mandatory
provisions. Though the Convention does not expressly stress this
point, the prevailing view is that in such a case Germany could not
deny the existence of the corporation' 3 but that it can regulate the
internal affairs of the corporation by its own laws. Thus, there will
be a corporation living in one state under two different legal sys-
tems. It is not hard to imagine that this will lead to immense diffi-
culties. 36 Nevertheless, the reservation under article 4 has been
made by Germany, Belgium, France, and Italy. 137
At this point one might be inclined to ask whether the Convention
does determine the personal law after all, or whether it only sets out
rules for recognizing the capacity according to article 6. As has been
indicated, it is not the unanimous view that personal law and recog-
nition are governed by one conflict rule.'38 Though that attitude is
prevailing in Germany, the contrary view is taken in Belgium, Italy,
Luxembourg, and France.131 The rationale of article 4 may be
thought to indicate that the conflict rule in the normal case applies
to all questions;"' however, this conclusion is heavily disputed.",
The prevailing view seems to be that, in Germany, at least the
capacity under article 6 and the personal law will be determined in
133 STEIN, HARMONIZATION, supra note 56, at 411.
13 M. COESTER, VORRANGPRINZIP DES TARIFVERTRAGES 17-22 (1974).
"I3 BUNDESTAGESDRUCKSACHE VI 1976, at 21; Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung, supra note 118, at
91, 94; Drobnig, supra note 13, at 118; Gessler, Gegenseitige Anerkennung von Gesellschaften
und juristischen Personen im EWG-Bereich, 1967 DER BETRIEB 326 [hereinafter cited as
Gessler]. Goldman takes a different view only requiring an accommodation. Goldman, Le
projet, supra note 30, at 226-27.
131 STEIN, HARMONIZATION, supra note 56, at 411-12; Drobnig, EWG, supra note 16, at 97-
98.
' 1972 BGBI. II 369, art. 2, para. 2 (Germany); CHAMBRE DES REPRESENTANTS SESSION 1968-
1969 No. 428, ExPosg DE MOTIFS 2 (Belgium); note 132 supra (France and Italy).
'" See notes 5-19 supra and accompanying text.
,31 STEIN, HARMONIZATION, supra note 56, at 410.
"I A. SANTA MARIA, LE SOciETA NELL DIRIrrO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 212 (1970); Beitzke,
Zur Anerkennung, supra note 118, at 95.
' STEIN, HARMONIZATION, supra note 56, at 411; Drobnig, EWG, supra note 16, at 127-28.
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the same way.'42 Notwithstanding these problems it seems to be
impossible to regard the Convention either as favoring the real seat
rule or-especially with regard to articles 3 and 4-the law of incor-
poration.
f. 1956 German-American Treaty. Finally, the Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and
Germany should be mentioned.' The Treaty provides in article
XXV, paragraph 5, that "[c]ompanies constituted under the appli-
cable laws and regulations within the territories of either Party
shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have their juridical
status recognized within the territories of the other Party." This
does not mean,' however, that Germany adheres to the rule of
incorporation. It only repeats the well-recognized principle of Ger-
man law' that a foreign corporation is automatically recognized
and is not compelled to file special papers. The question of what law
is applicable to a company is left open by the Treaty. Thus, this
provision does not give any guidance for the question here in issue.',
8. R6sum6
As it appears that in the United States a movement has begun to
restrict more and more the application of the incorporation rule and
even to favor the application of the law of the place of business,'47
which mostly coincides with the law of the real seat, and that in
Europe the demand for the incorporation theory is much stronger
than before,'48 one wonders which of these theories is more satisfac-
"I Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung, supra note 118, at 95; Gessler, supra note 135, at 325;
Goldman, Le projet, supra note 30, at 206. Gessler and Goldman arrive at this result not be
extending the scope of the Convention to the personal law, but by applying in principle the
same conflict rule. Drobnig also takes a very limited view. Drobnig, EWG, supra note 16, at
128-29.
143 Oct. 29, 1954, [1956] 2 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, 1956 BGB1. II 487, 763 (effective
July 14, 1956).
"' KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 113; Hadari, supra note 4, at 15.
See notes 5-10 supra and accompanying text.
"' This may be the reason why the Treaty usually is not cited in articles on conflict law of
corporations and why an article on the Treaty does not even mention this provision. Schwenk,
Der neue Freundschafts-, Handels- und Schiffahrts-Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, 12 JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 197 (1956).
Koppensteiner takes a contrary view (KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 113), as does Kronstein
with regard to the former treaty (KRONSTEIN supra note 67, at 52).
, See notes 85-99 supra and accompanying text.
The incorporation doctrine is favored by the following German authors: 1 E. FRANKEN-
STEIN, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 459 (1926); KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 133, 136; A.
NuSSBAUM. DEUTSCHES INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 185 (1932); 1 A. DCRINGER & M. HACH-
ENBURC.. HANDEISCESETZRITCH 1929, at 49 (by Geiler); Mann, Zum Problem der Staatsange-
horigkeit der juristischen Person, in FESTSCHRIFT FfJR MARTIN WOLFF 271, 281 (E. von
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tory. Certainly there are obvious advantages to the incorporation
rule: certainty, flexibility, practicability. But the opinion that the
incorporation theory belongs to the era in which economic border-
lines are struck down'49 and that the theory represents the future,
should not be emphasized without due consideration being given to
the experiences of the United States. Some problems caused by the
incorporation rule might be resolved, however, by applying the prin-
ciples of fraus legis and of public policy.'15 But by this, of course,
the theory loses one of its advantages, that of certainty.' 5 '
The real seat doctrine, on the other hand, does not provide for
certainty either, as it may be difficult to determine the real seat. A
few words in this regard should be said about the real seat of the
subsidiary controlled by a foreign parent. Here the control-which
is regarded as an important element for the determination of the
real seat-is exercised at the place of the foreign parent. Thus, a
controlled subsidiary would be subject to the laws of the parent
company.'52 This conclusion, however, is misleading. The real seat
remains at the principal center in which the affairs are governed
even if this results mostly in the reception of orders from the parent
company.'5 3 A similar problem arises if the enterprise consists only
of one legal entity, but is doing business in several countries. In
these cases multinationals usually have avoided the uncertainties
by incorporating subsidiaries in the host country rather than having
a branch there. 5' The difficulty of determining the real seat does not
appear to be insurmountable, and the enterprises interested in cer-
tainty as to the applicable law have usually attempted to establish
clear facts.
Similarily, the disadvantage of the real seat rule involved when
the seat is transferred from the state of incorporation to another
state might be avoided by applying a theory according to which the
moving company loses its identity as a company of the incorpora-
Caemmerer, W. Hallstein, F. Mann, & L. Raiser eds. 1952); Fikentscher, supra note 10, at
72; Kbtz, supra note 46, at 69-70; Schwandt, supra note 10, at 201; Schonle, Die Anerkennung
liechtensteinischerjuristischer Personen in Deutschland, 18 N.J.W. 1112, 1114 (1965).
,' K6tz, supra note 46, at 70.
" Niederer rejects this limitation as illogical because one cannot give the freedom to
choose law and then consider the choice as fraudulent. Niederer, supra note 33, at 143.
,5, Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 44.
52 These conclusions are used by Grasmann for proving that the seat doctrine is not conse-
quently applied in Germany. GRASMANN, supra note 20, at 172.
'm 1965 Resolution des Instituts de Droit International, art. 5, in 51 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 264 (1965).
"I Conard, Organizing for Business, in 2 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET-A
LEGAL PROFILE 61 (E. Stein ed. 1955).
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tion state, but gains a new identity in the state of its new seat when
it complies with the requirements of that state.'55 This approach
fulfills the interests of the "new" state and avoids at the same time
the disadvantages of the strictly logical method according to which
the existence of the corporation had ceased. 5 ' Besides these difficul-
ties, there is the disadvantage of the real seat rule that nonrecogni-
tion does not always meet the interests of the state concerned, and
may cause hardship on those persons whom the nonrecognizing
state pretends to protect.'57 Some of these disadvantages are met by
the application of renvoi, but one has to keep in mind that the
principle of renvoi has disadvantages, too; namely, that it causes
the problem of when to interrupt the international "ping pong."''5
Generally, however, the principle of renvoi is accepted in German
conflict of laws. 59
Furthermore, today the important impact of the corporation's
affairs on the host country's economy seems to stem mainly from
investment, tax, and currency problems, questions of antitrust law
and foreign regulations expressing a particular policy.' These prob-
"I For a discussion of this problem and other proposed solutions see Conard, Fundamental
Changes in Marketable Share Companies, in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF COMPARA-
TIVE LAW chs. 6-14 (K. Zweigert ed. 1972). Within the EEC this problem will be solved by
the foundation of a European company. See von Caemmerer, Entwurf einer europaischen
Gesellschaftsform, in EUROP)ISCHE HANDELSGESELLSCHAFr UND ANGLEICHUNG DES NATIONALEN
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS 54, 57 (E. von Caemmerer ed. 1968); Mann, The European Company,
19 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 468, 474 (1970).
151 2 RABEL, supra note 7, at 39.
'5 GRASMANN, supra note 20, at 177; see note 80 supra.
'5' For discussions of these problems see 1 J. BEALE, A. TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
55 (1935); W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. IX (1942); E.
LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 19 (1947); 1 RABEL, supra note 7, at 75;
Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1938).
's' EGBGB art. 27.
"' E.g., Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. APP. §§ 1-44 (1970); see
KOMMISSION DER EUROP.KISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN VOM NOVEMBER 7, 1973, DIE MULTINATIONALE
UNTERNEHMUNG UND DIE GEMEINSCHAFrSVORSCHRIFTEN, MITTEILUNGEN DER KOMMISSION AN DEN
RAT 2 (1973); Coing, Germany and the Multinational Enterprise, in NATIONALISM AND THE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 87, 99 (H. Hahlo, J. Smith, & R. Wright eds. 1973); Ellis, Die
rechtlichen Aspekte der europiischen Direktinvestitionen in den Vereinigten Staaten, in DIE
MULTINATIONALE UNTERNEHMUNG IN DER WELTWIRTSCHAFT 85 (S. Rolfe & W. Damm eds. 1971);
Hellmann, Amerikanische Direktinveatitionen in Europa, in DIE MULTINATIONALE UNTERNEH-
MUNG IN DER WELTWIRTSCHAFT 115, 125 (S. Rolfe & W. Damm eds. 1971); McLaren,
Amerikanische Antitrustpolitik und ausltindische Direktinvestitionen, in DIE MULTINATIONALE
UNTERNEHMUNG IN DER WELTWIRTSCHAFr 109, 112 (S. Rolfe & W. Damm eds. 1971); Vagts, The
United States of America and the Multinational Enterprise, in NATIONALISM AND THE MULTIN-
ATIONAL ENTERPRISE 3 (H. Hahlo, J. Smith, & R. Wright eds. 1973); Immenga, Nationale
Einmischung deirch multinationale Unternehmen, 20 AUSSEN W. 120 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Immengal.
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lems fall outside the scope of the personal law and they have sepa-
rate connecting factors (Anknupfungopankte). As it appears that
the problems have shifted from the protection of creditors and
shareholders to the protection of the whole economy, one might be
inclined to think that the determination of the personal law is not
such an important issue anymore and, especially, that the real
seat's concern has vastly diminished. But though there is a great
change in the economic situation and though the capital relations
are more intertwined than they used to be, there is in fact still a
reasonable concern of the state of the real seat regarding the applic-
able personal law. First, there are still a great many creditors and
shareholders within the state of the real seat. They need to be pro-
tected not only for the sake of themselves but because their
loss-especially in the extreme case of bankruptcy-might have an
immense impact on the whole economic and social situation of the
host country.'' Secondly, the form of organization of an enterprise
provided by the law expresses a kind of antitrust policy and a policy
with respect to the economic system.' Thus it seems to be quite
important for the host country to apply its own policy expressed in
the personal law. Thirdly, the state of the real seat will usually
maintain most, if not all, of the workers. This does affect the ques-
tion of the applicable personal law insofar as the principle of code-
termination has been developed, as it has in Germany.' 3
Though there are still remarkable interests of the host country,
one might be inclined to ask whether there is not a way of combining
considerations of these interests with the demands of international
trade. As there must be a personal law determinable abstractly, the
only possible way seems to be that a state should adopt a very
liberal attitude towards recognition by adopting the incorporation
doctrine, but applying, on the other hand, its own law to a number
of issues where its own interests are touched, notwithstanding any
contrary provision of the applicable personal law. 6' This approach
seems to have the advantages of the incorporation rule and protects
l"' Grossfeld, supra note 6, at 26. For discussions of how far the argument volenti non fit
injuria is regarded as applicable, see KOPPENSTNER, supra note 4, at 130-31; Grossfeld, supra
note 6, at 24.
112 E.g., provisions on minimum capital, provisions prohibiting the purchase of shares in
other legal persons, or provisions on the duration of a corporation. Grossfeld, supra note 6, at
27.
U KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 133.
," This attitude seems to be suggested in some respects by Niederer and by Koppensteiner
as far as codetermination is concerned. KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4; Niederer, supra note
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also the other disadvantages of the real seat theory. From a conflict
of laws view this approach can be justified by defining the scope of
the personal law quite narrowly and by developing separate conflict
rules for other matters. Generally it can be said that in Germany
this process of characterization is much more common than in the
United States,"5 though with regard to the personal law of corpora-
tions, conflict rules are not narrow. But even if a state is reluctant
to narrow the scope of the personal law, it might achieve the above
approach by applying its own law on some issues, though these
issues are part of the personal law, which is a foreign law. The
domestic law would be applied then not because of a conflict rule
but because its substantial provision requires application.' This
principle of immediate application-in Germany it is called
Sonderanknipfung'6T-is well known in private international law
and it is expressed as well in article 4 of the Convention on the
Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal Persons.' Thus, every
state in which the corporation's operations are having any effect
may apply portions of its own law to secure its interests. Thus, all
single interests are served ideally, but the whole is in disorder. The
corporation's internal affairs, its organization, and its liability, can-
not satisfactorily be subject to different laws. It might become im-
possible for a corporation to comply with all applicable laws which
might contain contrary provisions. Even if one would give only the
state of the real seat the opportunity to apply its own law on some
matters of personal law, the compromise would not be satisfactory.
The reason for this is that the personal law usually is composed of
10 D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS 19-32 (1965) (especially "Judge" Rheinstein's
imaginary opinion at 24-26).
'" Note 19 supra. For discussions of the principle of Sonderankniipfung see R. BXR, KAR-
TELLRECHT UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 222 (1965); Neumayer, Zur positiven Funktion
der kollisionsrechtlichen Vorbehaltsklausel, ein Beitrag zur Geltung zwingender Rechtssdtze
und iiberpositiver Grundnormen im internationalen Privatrecht, in 2 FESTSCHRIFr FOR HANS
D6LLE 179 (E. von Caemmerer, A. Nikisch, & K. Zweigert eds. 1963); Zweigert, Internation-
ales Privatrecht und 6ffentliches Recht, in 50 JAHRE INSTITUT FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT AN
DER UNIVERSrTT KIEL 124 (1965); Neumayer, Autonomie de la volonte et dispositions impera-
tives, en droit international priv des obligations, 47 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL
59 (1958); Neumayer, Die Notgesetzbung des Wirtschaftsrechts im internationalen
Privatrecht, 2 BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FOR VOLKERRECHT 45 (1958); Wengler,
Die Anknapfungdes zwingenden Schuldrechts im internationalen Privatrecht, 54 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 168 (1941); Zweigler, Nichterfillung auf Grund aus-
lCindischer Leistungsverbote, 11 RABELS Z. 283 (1947).
"' For the two possible meanings of this term see KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 145-46.
10 1968 Convention, supra note 19. The term goes back to the Statutentheorie, but can be
regarded as being discussed and accepted especially during the last 20 years. See BACHE,
supra note 4, at 82.
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provisions regarding rights and duties which correspond with one
another. If another set of provisions are applied to certain issues,
this system of balance will be broken up and the issue will be regu-
lated in a manner in which possibly no legislator wanted to have it
regulated. Thus, there will be created, as Currie once said,' half a
donkey and half a camel. 70 Another disadvantage would be that
certainty will be minimized as it might remain questionable to what
extent a state wants to apply its own law despite the applicable
personal law.
Thus, as the advantages of the compromise have been proved
delusive, the decision must be made between the "pure" incorpora-
tion rule and the real seat theory. It appears that the incorporation
doctrine is ideal as between states with the same standards in corpo-
ration law. Where this prerequisite has not been met, however, the
dangers and disadvantages of the incorporation doctrine are too
great and the interests of the state of the real seat still strong enough
to justify the application of its own law. Within the EEC, however,
where harmonization is in progress, it might be possible to accept
the incorporation doctrine in the near future. At this time the
differences in standards still appear to be too great and the danger
of a European race of laxity remains.17
"I Opinion of "Judge" Currie (as prepared by Currie), in D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW
PROCESS 34-43 (1965).
"7' Reese and Kaufman describe the situation as chaotic. Reese & Kaufman, supra note 31,
at 1142. It should be clarified that these criticisms mainly concern the application of different
personal laws. If a matter is characterized as falling outside the scope of the personal law, a
state may very well apply that law which wants to be applied according to its meaning. This
is done more and more, especially in the field of currency and investment regulations. See
Batiffol, supra note 1, at 36; references cited note 166 supra. These criticisms do not apply,
since the correlations between the different questions will usually be not so significant that
the application of different sets of law will break up an outbalanced system. However, the
principle will cause other difficulties and where two laws both wanting to be applied conflict,
the issue will become rather political. See CURRIE, supra note 2, at 177-82; Graue, Aussprache
zum Referat Zweigert, in 50 JAHRE INSTITUT FUR INTERNATIONALES RECHT AN DER UNIVERSITXT
KIEL 144 (1965); Mertens, Ausldndisches Kartellrecht, 31 RABELS Z. 385, 391 (1967);
Rehbinder, Die amerikanischen Restriktionen ftir Direktinvestitionen in Europa und das
deutsche Kollisionsrecht, 15 AussEN W. 346, 353 (1969). Here the question will arise whether
a judge can be expected to handle these issues or whether he should just apply the lex fori.
CURRIE, supra note 2, at 177, 182.
"I' It should be kept in mind that the view as to how far there should be a harmonization
is not unanimous. For a restricted interpretation of article 54, paragraph 3(g) of the Rome
Treaty, supra note 105, see Mohring, Aktuelle Wirkungen des EWG-Vertrages auf das
Niederlassungsrecht, den Dienstleistungsverkehr und das Agrarrecht, 1965 N.J.W. 1633,
1640.
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III. CONFLICT RULES CONCERNING A GROUP OF CORPORATIONS
A. Problems Involved
A very important issue for multinational enterprises is the ques-
tion of what conflict rule is to be applied to a group of corporations.
As one will find in this field not only one rule but several rules, each
concerning only a limited issue, it seems appropriate with regard to
the space available here to describe how these conflict rules are
ascertained, rather than to develop the single rules.'
B. Approach
1. Substantial Approach
The approach which seems to be generally accepted' asks first,
whether the statutory provision in question is to be applied with
respect to the substantive regulations it contains.' A provision, for
instance, concerned with the protection of the minority of share-
holders is from the German viewpoint only designed to protect mi-
nority shareholders of a German subsidiary. Hence, it will not be
applied to regulate the relations between a German parent and a
foreign subsidiary.' The same is said about provisions protecting
the creditors and about the validity of the transfer of shares from
an independent German corporation to another foreign corporation
which enables the foreign corporation to exercise control over the
German company. On the other hand, for example, provisions
which deal with the question of whether a controlled corporation can
acquire shares in the controlling company are provisions concerned
with the reduction of capital of the parent corporation. Therefore,
this seems to be a matter for the law of the parent corporation with
which to deal. Hence, German law only applies in case of a German
parent corporation, but not if the controlling company is a foreign
one.
76
172 BACHE, supra note 4, at 30; KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 136; LUCHTERHAND, supra
note 4, at 39.
13 BACHE, supra note 4, at 30; KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 92; H. WORDINGER, AKTIEN
UND KONZERNRECHT 21 (1972); Bringezu, Parent-Subsidiary Relations under German Law, 7
INT'L LAW. 138, 150 (1973); Immenga & Klocke, supra note 4, at 49; Prahs, supra note 4, at
395; Vagts, Book Review, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 683 (1972) (review of H.-G. KOPPENSTEINER,
INTERNATIONALE UNTERNEHMEN IM DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT (1971)).
-7, KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 93.
175 Koppensteiner, La protection des crkditeurs des soci~tes filiales, in COLLOQUE INTERNA-
TIONAL SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV9 DES GROUPES DE soci T9s 69 (B. Goldman ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Koppensteiner, La protection].
7 KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 155; cf Proposed Statute for the European Company,
art. 46, 13 BULL. E.E.C. Supp. No. 8 at 44 (1970).
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After it is determined that, according to the underlying rationale,
certain provisions must be applied to the relation between parent
and subsidiary, it might be shown, however, that provisions of the
law governing the other corporation may also be applicable. In such
a case it must be asked whether one may apply both laws cumula-
tively, as one does, for example, in determining the prerequisites of
both personal laws of two persons who want to marry.'" This cumu-
lation will be justified in cases where the connecting factors which
lead to both laws are equivalent. If they are not found to be equiva-
lent, the question arises as to which law shall prevail. In ascertain-
ing this question, the interests of the states involved will be taken
into account. But contrary to Currie's interest analysis'" one might
not proceed on a case-by-case basis, asking how far the interests of
the state are actually involved, but rather, proceed to determine the
issue abstractly. Thus, it is generally said that the state of the
controlled corporation has a prevailing interest in protecting outside
shareholders and creditors.'
2. Conflict Approach
In addition to this "substantial" test, however, it has been
deemed appropriate to apply the traditional test in private interna-
tional law-to characterize the given legal situation in order to
range it under a conflict rule.' 80 Thus, is is asked whether the matter
"I KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 172; Beitzke, Internationalrechtliches zur Gesells-
chaftsfusion, in PROSLEME DES EUROPAISCHEN RECHTS: FESTSCHRIFr FOR WALTER HALLSTEIN 14,
20 (E. von Caemmerer, A.-J. Schlochauer, & E. Steindorff eds. 1966).
"' CURRIE, supra note 2, ch. 2.
"' KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 174; Koppensteiner, La protection, supra note 175, at
79; Immenga, supra note 160, at 121. For a discussion of the similar but slightly modified
French view see Goldman, La protection des actionnaire minoritaires des soci~t~s filiales, in
COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVI DES GROUPES DE SOCII9TIS 7 (B.
Goldman ed. 1973); for the United Kingdom's modified view see Mann, La protection des
actionnaires minoritaires des sociktks filiales, in COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL SUR LE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL PRIV9 DES GROUPES DE socigrls 39 (B. Goldman ed. 1973); and for Switzerland's
modified view see Schluep, in COLLOQUE INTERNATIONAL SUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVI DES
GROUPES DE sociTfts 48 (B. Goldman ed. 1973). The proposed Statute for the European
Company, art. 224, 13 BULL. E.E.C. SuPP. No. 8 at 44 (1970), claims, however, to be applica-
ble in this regard even if the parent company is a socifte europkenne and the subsidiary has
its registered seat in the E.E.C. The reason for this is said to be that all subsidiaries of a
soci~t europeenne should be treated equally. For criticisms of article 224 see Koppensteiner,
Das Konzernrecht des EWG Verordnungsentwurfs ilber eine europliische Aktiengesellschaft
aus kollisionsrechtlicher Sicht, 16 AUSSEN W. 433, 437 (1970); Wglde, Die "Europiische
Aktiengesellschaft" und multinationale Unternehmen, 20 AUSSEN W. 82, 84 (1974); Walther,
Der Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss zum Statut far europdische Aktiengesellschaften, 18
DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFr 84, 89 (1973).
I KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 91; Koppensteiner, La protection, supra note 175, at
87.
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is one of personal law, of contract law, or of tort law. The demarca-
tion between issues of personal law and those of contract law is an
especially important but difficult question. In determining these
questions it must be observed to what extent these matters have
functions as, and in relation to, other problems which are obviously
of the personal law' and the effect which that characterization will
have on either of the legal systems. Thus, for instance, the question
of the protection of shareholders in case of a contract of domina-
tion82 has not been characterized as one of contract law, but as a
personal law problem. 83 Therefore, the principle of party autonomy
does not apply here.' 84 If, however, an issue turns out to be one of
contract law, such as a contract under section 292 of the German
Stock Corporation Law, it must be asked if nevertheless the provi-
sion of law is applicable by a rule of immediate application
(Sonderankniipfung).185 In applying this principle, one again asks
for the scope of application of the provision,8 " but this time under
the viewpoint of immediate application (Sonderanknipfung).
Though two methods can be applied in determining the applica-
ble conflict rule, there necessarily can be only one answer to the
problem of which law governs the issue in question; that means that
contrary results must be avoided. 87 Usually, the principle of
immediate application (Sonderanknipfung) will work very well in
this regard, as it applies a test similar to the one of the substantial
approach. Hence, determinations made with both tests have suc-
ceeded in achieving the same result by two different methods.
By this, however, only the threshold problem is solved as there
remains the question of how to characterize the remedies, institu-
tions, and the like, provided for in the foreign law which might, for
example, obtain the protection by another means. 8
As legislators have only recently begun enacting laws applying to
groups of companies, the future will show whether courts will adopt
conflict rules obtained by said method.
"' KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 151.
Law of Sept. 6, 1965, [1965] BGBI. 11089, § 293 (German Stock Corporation Act).
15 Immenga & Klocke, supra note 4, at 36.
"' BACHE, supra note 4, at 24; KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 154; Koppensteiner, La
protection, supra note 175, at 71.
" See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
"a KOPPENSTEINER, supra note 4, at 163.
Id. at 96; Koppensteiner, La protection, supra note 175, at 87.
"' For a discussion of these problems see Barz, Beherrschungs- und GewinnabfiIhr-
ungsvertrdge mit auslandischer Aktiengesellschaft, 21 BETMEBSBERATER 1168 (1966); Im-
menga & Klocke, supra note 4, at 53.
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